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DURING  THE 1980s monetary  policy emerged as the sole tool of U.S. 
stabilization  policy when  U. S. fiscal  policy  got caught  up  in an  ideological 
battle over the appropriate  size of government. Despite the inherent 
risks  of reliance  on a single  tool to manage  a multiplicity  of domestic  and 
external  economic  objectives,  the monetary  authorities  have  been highly 
successful over the past six  years. There is,  however, substantial 
uncertainty  about  the sustainability  of the current  policy mix. Financial 
markets,  in particular,  have been highly  volatile  and  susceptible  to sharp 
reactions  to every rumor  of potential  change  in Federal  Reserve policy. 
The events of 1979-82  convinced all of us of the power of monetary 
policy to restrain  aggregate  demand. Yet we cannot ignore the large 
interest  rate  increases  and  the financial  disruption  associated  with those 
restrictive  policies. With the recent re-emergence  of inflationary  pres- 
sures, questions  have been raised  about  how high  interest  rates  will have 
to go to dampen  future  demand  growth.  Has the economy become more 
resistant  to control by monetary  policy, and will the range of interest 
rate change  required  to achieve a given change  in aggregate  demand  be 
even larger  in the future?  In this paper  I examine  possible changes  in the 
linkage between monetary  policy and three sections of the economy: 
household expenditures, including  expenditures  for both housing and 
consumption,  business investment,  and  foreign  trade.  I 
1.  One aspect that I do not discuss,  but that may deserve mention, is the growth of the 
public debt relative  to GNP.  As  the debt rises,  monetary restraint is coming to have a 
significant offsetting expansionary effect on fiscal policy as it increases government interest 
payments.  Given the current maturity structure of the public debt, a 1 percentage  point 
rise in market rates will increase the budget deficit by $12 billion (annual rate) by the fourth 
quarter following the change. 
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History  is replete  with examples  of how markets  change  to soften the 
consequences of external disturbances and evade the objectives of 
regulators.  Is it not likely that markets  would also develop a defense 
against interest rate fluctuations?  Housing finance, for example, has 
undergone  a whole series of institutional  reforms  and systemic changes 
aimed at reducing the vulnerability  of the industry to fluctuations  in 
market  interest  rates. Among  the changes  are deposit rate  deregulation, 
adjustable  rate mortgages,  and the growth  of the market  for mortgage- 
backed securities. Many  analysts argue  that these reforms  have largely 
eliminated  the quantity  rationing  of mortgage  loans, believed to account 
for  the heavy, short-term  concentration  of monetary  restraint  on housing 
in the past. In other areas, however, the evidence seems more mixed. 
The sharp reduction  in marginal  tax rates and restrictions  on interest 
deductions  should  increase  the sensitivity  of consumers  to interest  rate 
changes.  And  the  continual  growth  in  reliance  on debt  finance  by business 
hardly seems consistent with adoption of a more defensive financial 
strategy. 
Finally, while it may be reasonable  to argue that domestic changes 
have reduced  the impact  of monetary  policy, the emergence  of an active 
international  capital market,  with the potential  for monetary  policy to 
affect net trade  flows through  induced  changes  in exchange  rates, would 
seem to be a contrary  development  of overwhelming  importance.  One 
need  only  go back  to economic  textbooks  of the 1970s,  with  their  minimal 
attention to  the possibility of  monetary policy influencing demand 
through exchange rates, to appreciate the change in the economic 
profession's perspective on the linkage between interest rates and 
aggregate  demand. However, the emergence of trade flows as a big 
element  in the  linkage  raises  new issues about  the strategy  for conducting 
monetary  policy. First, it is the differential  between U.S. and foreign 
interest  rates, rather  than  their  level, that  is most relevant  for exchange 
rate determination.  Thus, it becomes crucial to take account of the 
potential  reaction  in foreign  financial  markets  to a change  in U.S. policy. 
Second, econometric efforts to trace the linkages between changes in 
exchange  rates, trade  prices, and  trade  flows suggest  that  the adjustment 
process is subject  to extremely long lags. Thus, the ability  to influence 
trade  flows  is of limited  value  for short-run  stabilization  policy, and  there 
may be an increased risk of over- or undershooting  by the monetary 
policymakers. 
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monetary  restraint,  the analysis that follows is quite speculative and 
often indirect. Because of their reliance on historical relationships, 
existing econometric models are ill suited to the issues that I wish to 
examine. Quite  apart  from  the inability  of historically  estimated  models 
to capture  developments  during  the 1980s  that might  change the effect 
of monetary  policy, the models have never agreed  on the quantitative 
importance  of monetary policy, including the net aggregate demand 
effect of a change  in monetary  policy.2 
Household Sector 
Three  institutional  developments  of the past decade  have affected  the 
response of households to interest rate changes. First, the growth  of a 
large  market  for mortgage-backed  securities  and the removal  of regula- 
tions placing  a ceiling on deposit rates of the mortgage-lending  institu- 
tions have largely eliminated  quantity  rationing  in the home financing 
market. In past decades home buyers were often forced out of the 
housing  market  by the denial  of credit.  Today  increased  competition  on 
the lender side means that price-interest  rates-plays  a larger  role in 
balancing  demand  and  supply.  The  inflow  of funds  into  saving  institutions 
no longer  limits  significantly  the supply  of mortgage  funds  since  mortgage 
lenders can now repackage  the mortgages  for sale into an active diver- 
sified  market  for mortgage-backed  securities. 
Second, the growing use of adjustable  rate mortgages,  which now 
account for nearly half of newly issued home mortgage loans, has 
dampened  the impact  of interest  rates  on housing  demand.  Even though 
the expected life of adjustable  rate mortgages  is less than that of fixed 
rate mortgages, the ARM share of the outstanding stock of home 
mortgages  has grown  to about  25 percent, or $500  billion.  This estimate 
includes $75-80 billion of home equity loans, nearly all of which have 
adjustable  rates.3 
2. Bryant,  Holtham,  and  Hooper  (1988,  pp. 76-79); and  Adams  and  Klein  (1989).  The 
latter  study produced  estimates  of the slope of the IS curve  for eight models  of the U.S. 
economy  that  differed  after  four  quarters  by a factor  of three. 
3. These quantitative  estimates  are  taken  from  Goodman,  Luckett,  and  Wilcox  (1988). 
ARMs are known to represent  40 percent of the mortgage  assets of thrift institutions 
surveyed  by the Federal  Home Loan Bank  Board,  and  they are increasingly  common  for 
mortgage-backed  securities  (mortgage  pools), with  outstanding  issues of about  $50  billion. 80  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
In the past, some of the impact of monetary  policy on the housing 
market may have resulted from the willingness of  homebuyers to 
postpone their purchases until mortgage  rates were lower. If so, that 
effect would be dampened  now that homebuyers  can act independently 
of their  perception  that  current  rates are temporarily  too high  by getting 
an adjustable  rate mortgage  without delaying  the actual purchase  of a 
house. In effect,  homeowners now have the same option open to 
corporations  of switching  between long- and short-term  credit without 
changing  the timing  of their actual  purchase  when they believe interest 
rates  are  abnormally  high.4  In addition,  whereas  homebuyers  may  prefer 
a fixed rate, they will switch to an adjustable  rate loan, particularly  if it 
has an initial  discount,  as a way of continuing  to qualify  for a loan during 
a period  of high  interest  rates. 
Although  the development  of adjustable  rate mortgages  may cushion 
the impact  of monetary  policy on the housing  market,  the potential  for 
interest  cost increases  on existing mortgages  may heighten  the effect of 
monetary  policy on other expenditures  of households. Borrowers  with 
adjustable  rate loans might be expected to hold a larger cushion of 
financial  assets against  the risk of a potential  increase  in their  mortgage 
payments.5  The biggest potential impact, however, would result from 
the effects of liquidity  constraints  on borrowers.  If young households, 
who are net debtors,  are constrained  in their  ability  to take  on new debt, 
increases in interest rates may have a highly asymmetric  effect on the 
expenditures  of debtor  and creditor  households. An increase  in interest 
costs would force credit-constrained  households to reduce their cash 
expenditures  on other  items more  than  the expenditures  of older  creditor 
households  are increased  by the rise in interest  income. 
It is important,  however, not to exaggerate  the extent to which the 
4.  Many economists  would argue that changes in long-term interest rates are, in fact, 
a random walk, but that does not prevent individual borrowers from thinking otherwise. 
Corporate  short-term  financing  is  strongly  procyclical  with  respect  to  interest  rate 
fluctuations.  Households  can be observed  to do the same,  although that behavior  may 
reflect a response to the criteria for qualifying for long-term mortgages. 
5.  Mortgage loans  with provisions  for negative  amortization-keeping  constant  the 
monthly payments while lengthening the repayment period as rates rise-remain  uncom- 
mon. ARMs linked to the cost of funds index do adjust rates monthly so that there will be 
negative  amortization  if rates rise  during a year.  The  loans  are recomputed  annually, 
however,  to amortize the loan fully over  its remaining term. Even  within the year, the 
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interest rates on these loans are adjustable  in response to changing 
market  rates. While the rate on over 90 percent of ARMs is adjustable 
within 12 months, three-quarters  of the loans limit the increase to no 
more than the equivalent  of 2 percentage  points a year, and 98 percent 
of the loans limit the increase over the life of the mortgage  to 5 to 6 
percentage  points. In addition,  these mortgages  are issued with sizable 
initial rate discounts that averaged as high as 325 basis points in the 
fourth quarter of  1988-thus,  the adjustment  of the rate on a new 
mortgage  is largely  independent  of market  rate changes  for the first  two 
years. The one-year  Treasury  rate  is the most commonly  used base rate, 
but many loans are tied to an index of the average cost of funds for 
savings  and loans that fluctuates  less than the Treasury  rate. Given the 
current stock of ARMs of $500 billion, the upper limit of change in 
interest  payments  would seem to be $10 billion after one year and $20 
billion after two years. Even if mortgage  holders reduced their other 
expenditures  by the full amount  and there was no change in outlays of 
the recipients  of interest income, the impact would represent  only 0.6 
percent  of total  consumption.  Thus,  while  these loans  do provide  lenders 
with some protection  against  a secular  rise of market  interest  rates, the 
potential  for large  cyclical increases  in the monthly  mortgage  payments 
of borrowers  is still limited. 
The third  source  of change  is the 1986  revision  of the income tax code 
that eliminated  the deductibility  of consumer interest payments and 
further  reduced marginal  income tax rates, lowering the value of the 
mortgage  interest deduction. Both of these tax changes should have 
increased consumers' response to interest rate variations. While it is 
true  that  the consumer  interest  provision  can  be avoided  by homeowners 
if they are willing  to use home equity lines of credit as a substitute  for 
installment  debt, such practices have been limited to date.6  However, 
the tax deductibility  of consumer  interest will not be completely elimi- 
nated  until 1991,  and the home equity loan may require  time to achieve 
acceptability. 
The interest component  of personal  income is shown in table 1. Its 
6. At the end of 1987  the stock of installment  debt  totaled  $624  billion,  compared  with 
less than  $100  billion  in home equity  loans, and many  of the home equity  loans appear  to 
be a substitute  for home improvement  loans. A simple statistical  correlation  between 
changes  in automotive  credit  loans and  automobile  purchases,  for example,  suggests  that 
there  has been no significant  shift  in this relationship  since 1986. 82  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
Table 1.  Interest Income of Persons in the National Income and Product Accounts, 
Selected Years,  1960-87 
Percent of personal income 
Item  1960  1970  1980  1987 
National accounts basis 
Personal interest income  6.1  8.3  12.0  13.9 
Consumer interest payments  1.7  2.0  2.1  2.4 
Net  income  4.4  6.3  9.9  11.5 
Cash  flow basis 
Interest incomea  3.8  5.5  7.7  8.3 
Interest  paymentsb  3.4  4.0  5.5  6.7 
Net  income  0.4  1.5  2.2  1.6 
Addenda 
Nonmonetary  interest incomec  2.3  2.8  4.3  5.7 
Mortgage interest payments (owner-occupied)d  1.7  2.0  3.4  4.3 
Source:  Survey of Clurrent  Blusiniess  (July 1988), tables 8.8,  8.9; and prior issues. 
a.  Monetary interest receipts. 
b.  Monetary consumer  interest payments  plus mortgage interest payments. 
c.  Includes interest paid to private pension and life insurance plus services  furnished without payment by financial 
institutions,  line 48 of table 8.8 of the national accounts. 
d.  Lines  90 and 97 of table 8.9 of the national accounts. 
share of total income, as computed in the national  accounts, steadily 
increased from 6.1 percent in 1960 to  13.9 percent in 1987 (line 1). 
Consumer  interest payments (mainly  installment  debt), treated in the 
national accounts as a separate item on the expenditure side, has 
increased  from 1.7 percent to 2.4 percent of personal  income (line 2). 
Thus, the household  sector appears  in the national  accounts  to be a large 
net recipient  of interest  income (line 3). 
However, two important  qualifications  influence  the actual  cash flow 
of households. First, much of the interest income actually accrues to 
pension funds and life insurance  accounts owned by households and is 
not immediately available for discretionary spending. The national 
accounts also include in interest income an imputation  for the implicit 
interest  that  consumers  earn  on deposit-type  accounts  but  receive in the 
form  of reduced  service charges.  As shown in line 7 of table 1, these two 
components represented 41 percent of total interest income in 1987 
(5.7/13.9). 
Second, homeownership  is treated  as abusiness  activity  in  the  national 
accounts. Consumption  expenditures  include  an imputation  for the rent 
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mortgage interest, and property taxes,  the residual income of  the 
homeowner  is added to personal income. Net rental income of home- 
owners is currently  a negative number  in the national  accounts. Thus, 
mortgage  interest  payments  are  included  in the expenses of the business 
sector rather  than  of households. 
If we restructure  the household  accounts to exclude interest  income 
not received as a cash receipt by households and include mortgage 
interest as a cash flow expense, the net interest income position of 
households  is substantially  reduced  (line  6). The return  on the remaining 
financial  assets, however, is more  sensitive to market  interest  rates  than 
are  interest  rates  paid  on mortgage  and  consumer  debt. One study  found 
that  a 100  basis-point  increase  in  one-year  Treasury  yields  was associated 
with a 25 basis-point  increase  in the return  on interest-bearing  assets of 
the household sector within one year, and 40 basis points within two 
years.7  Thus, the net interest income of households increases during 
periods  of rising  market  interest  rates. 
Interest  rate  increases  also generate  capital  losses for holders  of long- 
term  financial  claims. However, the household sector is a net debtor  in 
the long-term  market. Long-term  bonds are held largely by financial 
institutions,  whereas  households  have 70  percent  of their  financial  assets 
in deposit accounts, and home mortgage  liabilities slightly exceed the 
value  of all  their  credit  market  instruments.  Thus, major  financial  capital 
gains or losses are mainly  associated with any induced changes in the 
value of corporate  stocks. 
Many  of the structural  changes  identified  above were initiated  before 
the 1979-81  round  of monetary  restraint;  given the time  it takes for such 
changes to spread  through  the system and come to maturity,  however, 
it is reasonable  to think  that they will be far more important  next time. 
Adjustable  rate mortgages, in particular,  were still uncommon  in the 
early 1980s.  While  these changes  are likely to have altered  the channels 
through which monetary policy operates, the absence of significant 
monetary  restraint  in the United States over the past six years makes it 
impossible to reach any conclusion on the quantitative  importance  of 
those changes. 
The  approach  taken  in  the  following  section  is to look at  the  experience 
of Canada,  which has had adjustable  rate mortgage  systems for many 
7. Goodman,  Luckett,  and  Wilcox  (1988). 84  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1989 
years and which does not allow the deduction of interest expenses 
(mortgage  and consumer credit) in the computation  of income taxes. 
Canada  would seem particularly  well suited for a comparison  with the 
United States because the two countries have had a similar  history of 
economic fluctuations  and  monetary  interest  rates. 
The Canadian Experience 
Despite the many  obvious similarities  between the economic choices 
faced by U.S. and Canadian  households, the historical  patterns  of the 
personal  saving  rates  in the two countries  scarcely  seem to represent  the 
behavior of the same species (see figure 1). After several decades of 
running  in parallel,  the two saving  rates  began  to diverge  in the late 1960s 
when the Canadian  saving  rate soared  upward.  It rose again  in the early 
1980s, but has reversed and fallen sharply in the past five years. 
Meanwhile,  the U.S. saving  rate  has  exhibited  greater  stability  at a lower 
level, with some tendency to decline since the mid-1970s. It is also 
evident, in figure  2, that  residential  construction  in Canada  has not been 
subject  to the large  fluctuations  that are so characteristic  of the United 
States. 
The similarity  of interest  rate  movements  and  inflation  in Canada  and 
the United States is shown in table 2. In fact, given the lack of a tax 
deduction  for  interest  expenses in  Canada,  Canadian  households  actually 
were faced with a larger  swing in effective after-tax  interest  rates than 
were U.S. households.  The rate  of inflation  of consumer  prices was also 
somewhat  higher  in Canada  than in the United States during  the 1970s 
and  early 1980s,  but  the two rates  have converged  in recent  years. While 
mortgage  interest  rates are not shown in the table, they have fluctuated 
in tandem  with other interest rates, with the rate in Canada  averaging 
1.5 percentage  points above the U.S. rate. 
Much  of the difference  in saving  behavior  is commonly  attributed  to 
differences  in the tax treatment  of saving-particularly the availability 
of  generous tax exemptions in Canada for Investment Retirement 
Accounts following  the overhaul  of the tax system in the early 1970s.8 
For both countries, however, it is possible to  distinguish between 
contractual  (private  pension  and  retirement  accounts)  and  discretionary 
saving. While contractual  saving has increased in importance  in both 
8. A recent  example  is Carroll  and  Summers  (1987). Barry Bosworth  85 
Figure 1.  Personal Saving Rates, Canada and the United States,  1962-87 
Percent  of disposable income 
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Source:  Standard National  Accounts  of the Organization for Economic  Cooperation  and Development. 
Figure 2.  Indexes of Residential Construction, Canada and the United States,  1960-87 
Index, 1980 =  100 
160 
140  / 




60  -  Canada 
40  - 
20  .  l  j 
1965  1970  1975  1980  1985 
Source: Data for the United States  are from Survey of Currenit  Business,  various issues;  and Bureau of Economic 
Analysis  (1986). Data for Canada are from Statistics  Canada. sX  l  U l  >:  x  o  -  Tz  -  y  wO  (N  c\q  x  (^>] -  -  vo  mP  l  c  v  t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C' 
.% e  t  e  ?  o  oo  m ? b oE  o oE  m  t  e  e  N  t  c  t  U~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C' 
.o  S  ?  U  i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r  ~~~~~~~~  6  V  6V  4  t  t~  'o' 
w  q  E  S  >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r 
s  U  oo  o  t N  t  m  ?  e  t  ?  m  o  e  N  e  oE  ?  b  b  u  *  t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C' 
U t  N  t ? O  O  b  b  b  00  0  O  ?  e  e  e  e  r  >  tk~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-,: 
CsC  t  . 
kr  C)  e  Nt  00  "t  O)  C)  ?  8bO  e<' 
X  .% t  ?  b b b oo oo oo  oo oo  cr  t  e  N  N  cn  oe  c  2  W~~~~~~~~t 
.t  S  z  >  <M  R~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Z 
g  D  o  .t  X~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 
X~~~~~~~  4  CN  4  4  gV~ 
>  e  b  m  e  ?  O  t  00  0  b b N 00 b  t t  e  00  Q  >  X~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Z 
F  04  U b  08 N  m  08  0  b  N  N  t  O  e  b  b  m  08  CN  <  t  >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.t 
l  O t  m ?  ? b b 00 08  08 00  08  0  N  m  t  N  Ch  08  q  o  U  v~~~~~~~~~~~~0 
C  n  X  i  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~to* 
U:  L  X  k  ^  t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Z 
Q  U  <  R  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~to  X 
Ct  .0  t  m O  m t  o0 O ? oo  t m  00  N  O  m  Y  <  >~~~~~~~~~~~7 
. =  w  X  t t ?  t  ?  ?  m  t  N  N  N  N  e  O  o  o  o  b  ,  e  t~~~~~~~~~~_  &  . 
;  U  R  S  <  O  t~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
=  ~  ~~~~~  4  VU  o~  VU  V< 6  -  6r-  6r 
em~~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ m  U  o  1,  -- 
X  U  *<d  a-t  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Et 
Q  04  U  ?  e m  e  t  e  N  ?  ?  00  m  00  t  t  O  N  A  tS  Q 
em  .t  F-oZ  ?  b  oo  b  08  oe  oe  b  ?  b  ?  b  b  ?  m  ?  t  t  e  rC  4  X  00  >~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~q 
=~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  Q  QSo 
*5~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~~~~C  CN CN CN  CN  .?-  N  Nc,  l Barry Bosworth  87 
countries (see table 2) and by a larger  amount  in Canada,  it is evident 
that  the large  swings  in the Canadian  saving  rate  are  reflected  in the more 
discretionary component. In an evaluation of the potential role of 
monetary policy, cyclical fluctuations  are of more interest than the 
secular  trend.  From  this perspective  the notable  feature  of the Canadian 
tax system is the lack of a tax deduction for mortgage  and consumer 
interest, a factor that might increase the marginal  sensitivity of debt- 
financed  expenditures  to the interest  rate. 
The emphasis on adjustable  rate mortgages  began in Canada  in the 
1960s;  by the beginning  of this decade the dominant  system was one in 
which the repayment  of mortgage  principal  is amortized  over twenty- 
five years, but the term  of the loan contract  varies between one and five 
years. Thus, borrowers  can obtain a fixed rate for a maximum  of five 
years, and there is no limit on the potential  rate increase  they may face 
upon  renewal.  During  the early 1980s,  when mortgage  rates  rose as high 
as 20 percent, borrowers  did actively move toward  shorter  maturities  in 
anticipation  of future interest rate declines. Many got caught in an 
upward  spiral  of higher  payments  as they rolled  over their  loans for one- 
year  periods  only to be faced with  even higher  rates  in subsequent  years. 
Thus, a major  difference  between the two countries  is that in Canada 
changes  in the new mortgage  rate will translate  relatively  quickly  into a 
higher  effective rate on the outstanding  stock of mortgages.  Although 
Canada  does not collect data on the stock of mortgages  and interest 
payments  for  owner-occupied  housing,  the  effective  rate  on all  mortgages 
is, as expected, much  more  responsive  to current  market  rates  than  it is 
in the United States. A statistical  regression  using annual  data for the 
period  after  1975,  representing  an  era  of a mature  adjustable  rate  system, 
implies  that  nearly  half  of any change  in the market  rate  will be reflected 
in the yield on the outstanding  mortgage stock within two years. In 
contrast,  a similar  regression  in the United States over the period 1960- 
85, when adjustable  rate mortgages  were a small portion of the total 
stock, suggests  a response  of only about 15  percent. 
CANADIAN  HOUSING  DEMAND.  Our  first expectation that a system 
of adjustable rate mortgage financing should reduce fluctuations in 
housing  demand  does seem borne out by the Canadian  experience. As 
shown  in  figure  2, the  year-to-year  fluctuations  in  residential  construction 
are substantially  smaller  in Canada  than they are in the United States, 
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82. For example, residential  construction  in real terms in the United 
States fell 38 percent  between 1979  and 1982.  The equivalent  decline in 
Canada  was 16  percent-less  than  half, despite  very similar  movements 
in market  interest rates. The standard  deviation in the share of GNP 
devoted to residential  construction  was 0.43 in Canada  during  1970-87, 
compared  with 0.75 in the United States.9 
Furthermore,  the reduced  fluctuation  does appear  to reflect a lower 
sensitivity  to interest  changes  in Canada.  Table  3 presents some regres- 
sions that  relate  the share  of GNP devoted to residential  construction  to 
the differential  between the short-  and long-term  interest rates and the 
level of the short rate. The interest rate differential  is used to capture 
both the effects of financial disintermediation  and the tendency of 
potential homebuyers to postpone purchases during relatively high 
interest  rate periods. Both interest  rate terms are significantly  negative 
for the United States, and the coefficients appear  to be stable across 
various subperiods.  However, the interest  rate coefficients  for Canada 
are about half those of the United States, and if we exclude the early 
part of the data period, the coefficients on the interest  rate differential 
become slightly  positive and insignificant.  This decline in the influence 
of the term structure  of interest  rates is precisely the effect that should 
emerge  from  an adjustable  rate system. 
The equation used for the United States also predicts a significant 
decline  in construction  activity  in 1987-88;  that  the decline  did  not occur 
provides  some weak evidence that  the housing  market  has  become more 
immune to interest rate changes. Certainly it is true that financial 
disintermediation-the outflow  of deposit  funds  during  high  interest  rate 
episodes-no  longer  seems to have any implication  for housing  demand. 
Insured  savings and loans experienced  a net outflow  of new deposits in 
both 1987  and 1988,  and  the growth  of deposits was less than  the interest 
credited  to existing  accounts, yet overall  mortgage  lending  and  residen- 
tial construction  continued  at a rapid  pace. 
CANADIAN  SAVING  BEHAVIOR.  The historical pattern of change in 
the Canadian  saving  rate, shown in figure  1, is certainly  suggestive  of a 
marked  sensitivity  of other expenditures-consumption-to  changes  in 
interest  rates, something  that is difficult  to detect in the U.S. data. The 
saving  rate,  for  example,  rose sharply  in both 1974-75  and 1981-82  when 
9. The data  for both  countries  display  no evidence  of a secular  trend  during  1970-87. Barry Bosworth  89 
Table 3.  Comparative Interest Sensitivity of Canadian and U.S.  Housing Demand, 
Selected Periods, 1965-87a 
Canada  United  States 
Independent  variable  1965-87  1972-87  1965-87  1972-87 
(IRIGNP)_  lb  0.52  0.29  0.50  0.34 
(2.6)  (1. 1)  (4.9)  (2.3) 
(RS -  RL)-IC  -0.15  . .  .  -0.27  -0.24 
(1.9)  (5.1)  (3.4) 
RS-I  0.00  -0.08  -0.08  -0.12 
(0.0)  (2.6)  (2.9)  (2.4) 
Constant  2.76  5.14  2.54  3.65 
(2.1)  (3.1)  (4.1)  (3.1) 
Summary statistic 
Rj2  0.42  0.57  0.80  0.91 
Standard error  0.38  0.35  0.34  0.26 
Source:  Author's  calculations.  Underlying  U.S.  data from Survey of Current Business,  various  issues,  and BEA 
(1986). Canadian data from Statistics  Canada. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  residential  investment  percentage  share  of  GNP  (constant  prices).  Numbers  in 
parentheses  are t-statistics. 
b.  Dependent  variable lagged one pefiod. 
c.  RS =  three-month Treasury bill rate. RL =  long-term bond rate (see  table 2, note a). 
interest  rates surged.  If Canadians  were simply more responsive  to the 
improved  rate of return  on saving, we would expect the saving rate to 
be most closely related  to the real rate  of interest. On the other hand, if 
some households are liquidity constrained  and worry about the cash 
flow problems  of meeting higher mortgage  interest costs, their saving 
should be more responsive to nominal interest rate changes.'0  Thus, 
Canada  should  provide  an  opportunity  to test the  hypothesis  that  liquidity 
constraints  are  important  by examining  the relative  influence  of nominal 
and  real  interest  rates. 
The  asymmetric tax  treatment of  interest income and interest 
expenses in Canada  creates an additional  reason for being concerned 
with  nominal  interest  rates. In the United States before 1981  the income 
tax applied  to net capital  income, and  individuals  were allowed  to deduct 
interest  expenses. Canada,  on the  other  hand,  taxes gross  capital  income, 
and the absence of interest deductions imposes a large tax penalty on 
debt-financed  expenditures  that  is a rising  function  of the  nominal  interest 
rate. In most cases  it is  not an important distinction for wealthy 
10. Hendry  and  von Unger-Sternburg  (1981). 0) 
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individuals,  who can sell financial  assets to finance the purchase of a 
home, for example, but it is significant  for middle-income  individuals.  1I1 
A simple illustration  of the potential importance  of these factors is 
provided  by estimating  a regression  that  relates  the saving  rate  to changes 
in disposable  income, the rate  of interest,  and  the rate  of consumer  price 
inflation.  The change  in income is included  to adjust  for the pronounced 
difference between the short- and long-run marginal  propensities to 
consume. The rate of price inflation  is included  to reflect  three separate 
influences  on saving. First, it is justified  as an element in the concept of 
a real  rate  of interest,  leading  to the expectation  of a coefficient  opposite 
in sign  to that  on the nominal  interest  rate. Second, the national  accounts 
do not adjust interest income for the inflation  component that simply 
compensates  recipients  for the decline in the real value of their  financial 
assets. Thus, saving, as an addition to real wealth, is reported at an 
artificially  high  level during  periods  of high  inflation.  This  factor  leads to 
an expectation of a positive coefficient on the inflation  rate. Third, if 
households  are  influenced  by liquidity  constraints  (cash  flow),  we should 
expect their  behavior  to be dominated  by variations  in nominal  interest 
rates  rather  than  a real  rate  that  is adjusted  for inflation. 
Some alternative  equations are reported  in table 4. I experimented 
with  both  long-  and  short-term  interest  rates,  and  because  the differences 
were trivial, only those equations  with a long-term  rate are reported.  I 
also used both  a centered  moving  average  of the consumer  price  deflator 
to represent  inflation  and the one-year change. Again the differences 
were minor,  and the one-year  change  is used for the reported  equation. 
The real rate of interest is simply the nominal  rate minus the rate of 
inflation  with no adjustment  for tax rates. With  respect  to lags I searched 
over the interval  of zero to two periods  and chose a one-period  lag, the 
simplest  form  consistent  with minimizing  the standard  error.  12 
The basic result for Canada  is shown in the first column. There is a 
highly significant  positive correlation  with the nominal  interest rate in 
the prior  two years, although  there is no evidence of any effect in the 
first  period. Second, the saving rate is positively correlated  with infla- 
tion-not  the negative  effect that  would be expected if the real rate  was 
11. Neither country  includes the implicit  income from home ownership  or durable 
goods in the definition  of taxable  income. 
12. All of the equations  show weak  evidence  of autocorrelation  in the residuals,  but  a 
correction  has little  influence  on the reported  coefficients. 92  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
the major  determinant  of saving. This result is confirmed  in column 2, 
where the use of a real interest rate results in a substantial  increase in 
the standard  error and an increase in the positive coefficient on the 
inflation  rate. In addition,  the results  are  largely  unaffected  by excluding 
data for the 1980s (see column 4) or the period before 1972, when 
retirement  accounts become important  in Canada  (column  5).13 
Comparable  equations  for the United States are shown in columns  6 
through  8. There was no evidence of a significant  correlation  of saving 
with the level of either the nominal or real rate of interest. Instead, 
fluctuations  in stock market  prices  appear  to play a prominent  role; and, 
if they are included,  there  is some weak evidence that  the prior  period's 
change in the nominal  interest  rate is positively correlated  with saving. 
As shown in column 9, however, this result is not at all robust with 
respect to changes  in the period  of estimation.  In no case was it possible 
to obtain  a significant  positive coefficient  for the real interest  rate in the 
United States. Furthermore,  the change  in neither  the American  nor  the 
Canadian  stock market  prices appears  to have any significant  effect on 
the Canadian  saving  rate.)4 
Some further  evidence of the different  factors motivating  Canadian 
and U.S.  saving behavior is provided by examining  the allocation of 
saving  between tangible  assets, financial  assets, and  financial  liabilities. 
As shown in figure  3, the large  increase  in Canadian  saving  during  1978- 
82 was reflected in a sharp decline in the accumulation  of financial 
liabilities  rather  than an increase in tangible  or financial  assets. This is 
consistent  with the view that  the combination  of tax penalties  on interest 
payments  and a greater  exposure to interest  rate  fluctuations  stimulates 
efforts to reduce debt during  periods of rising interest rates. If it were 
taxes alone, the change  in financial  liabilities  would be expected to be a 
lower ratio  to disposable  income than  it is in the United States over the 
13. The retirement  accounts do seem to have significantly  affected the level of the 
saving  rate, shifting  the constant  term;  but  the marginal  coefficient  on the  interest  rate  was 
unaffected.  After 1972  the share  of income  devoted  to Registered  Retirement  Saving  Plans 
is largely  free of trend. 
14. The importance  of stock market  fluctuations  in the United States does suggest  a 
possible  indirect  role for interest  rates in altering  consumption  since higher  interest  rates 
do reduce  stock prices. However,  fluctuations  in the stock market  reflect  changes  in both 
the expected value of the future  income stream  and changes  in the discount  rate used to 
convert  that  income  stream  to a current  market  value. It is not at all clear  that  changes  in 
market  value  due solely to changes  in the discount  rate  should  alter  current  consumption. Barry Bosworth  93 
Figure 3.  Components of Saving, Canada, 1962-87 
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full period. While this tendency does exist, the differences  were quite 
small  until  the early 1980s.  15 
In summary,  there are striking  differences  between the structure  of 
the saving  relationship  in Canada  and in the United States-particularly 
as it relates  to the influence  of monetary  policy. The inference,  however, 
that those differences  can be traced  to differences  in the tax systems of 
the two countries  and the greater  exposure of Canadian  households to 
interest  rate  fluctuations  may  be more  tenuous.  In  addition,  the Canadian 
case may overstate the extent of future change in the United States 
because we have stopped short  of adopting  the Canadian  system. With 
only 25 percent  of the mortgage  market  subject  to adjustable  rates and 
with limits on interest rate changes of roughly  2 percent annually,  the 
potential increase in interest costs to consumers is still small in the 
15. Some further  evidence of a significant  interest effect on consumer  spending  in 
Canada  is provided  in a recent unpublished  paper  by Owen Evans of the International 
Monetary  Fund. He obtains significant  interest rate and inflation  effects for consumer 
spending  on both  durables  and  nondurables.  He also tested for change  in the interest  rate 
coefficient  over time  and  found  that  it increased  sharply  in value  after  the mid-1970s  in the 
equation  for durable  goods. 94  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
aggregate-$10-15 billion.  A restrictive  monetary  policy, sustained  over 
several years, could affect severely those individual  households with 
adjustable  rate mortgages,  but the aggregate  implications  are limited.  16 
Given  that  ARMs  are about  50 percent  of the market  for new mortgages, 
their  importance  will grow in the future. 
Business Investment 
Many econometric models incorporate a strong linkage between 
interest rates and business investment. While the lags are longer than 
for housing  investment, the response of business investment  is critical 
to the evaluation  of the impact of monetary  policy in the second and 
subsequent  years following a policy change. The econometric  studies, 
however,  have never  been  able  to achieve  a consensus  on the importance 
of financing  costs in investment  behavior  despite  a voluminous  literature 
on that  subject.  Before 1980  much  of the disagreement  over the influence 
of monetary  factors  on investment  could  be traced  to the  lack  of sufficient 
variation  in real rates of interest against which to test the alternative 
hypotheses. Although nominal interest rates varied over time, the 
different  methods of adjusting  them for inflation  expectations and the 
measurement  of the cost of capital  were sufficiently  ambiguous  to render 
the tests inconclusive. 
That  situation  might  have been expected to change  in the 1980s,  with 
real  interest  rates  extremely  high  by anyone's measure.  Table  5, column 
1, shows historical trends in nominal bond rates; column 2 shows a 
measure of the real rate that incorporates  the results of a survey of 
investors' long-term  inflation  expectations. Column 3 adjusts for the 
effects of changes  in the tax law by imbedding  the real interest  rate in a 
standard cost  of  capital formulation that takes explicit account of 
16. Originally,  I intended  to include  Great  Britain,  which  also relies  on adjustable  rate 
mortgages.  However, for much  of the relevant  period  Great  Britain  allowed  the building 
societies  to act as a monopoly  in the setting  of rates  and  severely  limited  competition  from 
other  institutions.  The result  was that  mortgage  rates  were set with  a heavy emphasis  on 
the interests  of existing  borrowers  and there  was extensive quantity  rationing  in the new 
loan market.  Thus, Great  Britain  did not represent  an example of an open competitive 
market  for home  finance. Barry Bosworth  95 
Table  5. Rates  of Return  on Financial  and Tangible  Assets, 1961-88 
Annual  percentage  rates 
Return on  Return on corporate 
financial  assets  Cost of  tangible  assetsa  Dividend- 
Nominalb  Realc  capitald  Before-tax  After-tax  price ratio 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
1961-65  4.51  2.30  7.07  10.73  6.55  3.11 
1966-70  6.59  2.06  5.76  10.61  6.62  3.35 
1971-75  8.11  2.00  5.20  8.27  5.18  3.56 
1976-80  9.64  2.59  5.28  7.81  4.90  4.88 
1981-85  13.26  6.28  7.59  6.94  5.18  4.86 
1986  9.96  4.56  7.86  7.74  5.85  3.49 
1987  9.83  4.30  8.07  7.91  5.58  3.08 
1988  9.90  4.68  8.66  8.00  5.18  3.64 
Sources:  Survey  of  Current Business,  various  issues;  BEA  (1985,  table  1.16); and  Board  of  Governors  of  the 
Federal Reserve  System  (1988). 
a.  Domestic  nonfinancial  corporate  profits adjusted  for  IVA  and CCA,  before  and after  taxes,  divided  by  the 
midyear average of the net value of domestic  nonfinancial tangible assets. 
b.  Moody's  Industrial Bond rate. 
c.  Nominal  rate of  return on financial assets  divided  by expected  inflation rate. Expected  inflation is based  on a 
10-year-ahead survey by Drexel-Burnham-Lambert,  Inc.,  after 1978, and the University  of Michigan survey for prior 
years. The series  was supplied by Owen Evans of the International Monetary Fund. 
d.  The cost  of capital exclusive  of  depreciation  using the cost  of funds  of columns  I and 2 and tax parameters 
from the MPS model of the Federal Reserve.  An arbitrary 7 percent risk premium is added to the cost  of capital to 
equate its average value to the average after-tax rate of return on tangible assets  (column 5) over the 1960-80 period. 
corporate  taxes.  17 This  adjustment  does reduce  the  magnitude  of increase 
during  1981-85,  but it still indicates  that the increase in financing  costs 
more than  offsets the positive effects of the 1981  tax reductions,  which 
were, in any case, reversed in 1986.18  Finally, it is always possible to 
argue that any increase in the cost of financing  new investment was 
offset by increases  in the expected rate  of return.  While  there is no way 
to compute  the marginal  return  on capital,  the fact that  the average  real 
return  on corporate  capital  (columns  4 and 5) has not increased  during 
the 1980s  casts doubt  on any such argument. 
17. The specific  formula  for  the cost of capital  is shown  later  in the  paper.  The  measure 
of the cost of capital  term  shown in column  3 is somewhat  unconventional  because it is 
computed  net  of depreciation  for  purposes  of comparison  with  columns  4 and  5. In  addition, 
without  an allowance  for risk, the after-tax  cost of funds,  adjusted  for inflation,  would  be 
negative  in the 1970s.  The data  of column  3 include  an arbitrary  constant  risk  factor  of 7 
percent  annually. 
18. The use of the after-tax  bond  rate  as a discount  factor  does tend  to reduce  the role 
of the 1981  changes  in depreciation  practices  because  it is lower  than  the discount  rate  that 
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Clearly, there has been a large reduction  in the margin  between the 
rates of return  on physical and financial  assets. The real cost of debt 
finance increased by 2 to 4 percentage points in the 1980s with no 
evidence of an offsetting  increase  in the return  on tangible  capital.  Thus, 
it might be argued that the 1980s have provided a strong test of the 
hypothesis that variations  in financing  costs can alter investment in a 
major  way. But nothing  is ever that simple. Events of the 1980s  seem to 
have so divided economists that they no longer agree even on whether 
investment  demand  has been strong  or weak. Supporters  of the admin- 
istration  are often quoted as pointing  to an investment  boom after the 
1981 tax changes, while other economists argue that investment has 
been declining  as a share  of national  income. Agreement  on the effects 
of changes in the tax law and the cost of funds is next to impossible 
without agreement  on the direction  of change in the variable  they are 
supposed  to affect. 
The disagreement  over recent  trends  in investment  centers  on the use 
of two alternative  measures  of investment  performance:  gross and net 
investment. The share of gross domestic product devoted to gross 
business investment  (1982  prices) was 12.3 percent in 1988,  well above 
the level of the 1970s,  while the net investment  rate (gross investment 
less depreciation)  fell to a level less than half that of the late 1970s  (see 
the top panel  of figure  4). This dramatic  divergence  between two highly 
acceptable  measures  of investment  results  from the growth  of expendi- 
tures on office computers and the way that those expenditures are 
adjusted  for price changes in the national  accounts. In constant 1982 
prices all of the growth  in business investment  between 1979  and 1988  is 
more  than  accounted  for by increased  expenditures  for office computing 
equipment-the total of all other  forms of investment  is below the level 
of 1979  in absolute amount.  Nominal  outlays on office equipment  have 
grown  substantially,  from  $14.5 billion  in 1979  to $40  billion  in 1988,  but 
in constant 1982 prices the increase has been eightfold because the 
relative  price of computers  as measured  by the fixed weight index has 
fallen  to only 15  percent  of its 1979  value. Thus, even if nominal  outlays 
had remained  a constant  share  of GDP, the constant  dollar  share  would 
have increased  by a factor  of six. 
The rapid  fall in computer  prices reflects  in large  part  their  rapid  rate 
of obsolescence in the face of technical change-thus  depreciation 
charges  have grown  apace. As a result, net additions  to the capital  stock Barry Bosworth  97 
Figure  4. Trends  in Business  Investment,  United  States, 1960-88 
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are  affected  much  less by the divergence  of relative  prices, and  it matters 
little whether the investment rate is measured  in current  or constant 
prices. 19 
The  importance  of outlays  on office  equipment  is highlighted  explicitly 
in the lower panel of figure 4.20 Expenditures  on producers' durable 
equipment  other than office equipment  have fallen dramatically  in the 
1980s. The interpretation  of trends in investment during  the 1980s is 
further  complicated  by the sharp  upsurge  of oil well drilling  after 1979 
and its collapse in 1986.  Adjusted  for both of these factors, the rate of 
accumulation  of other forms of capital has declined rather steadily 
throughout  the 1980s,  a pattern  more in accord  with the argument  that, 
despite a reduction  in taxes, high real interest rates have crowded out 
some domestic investment.21 
The treatment  of computers also complicates the interpretation  of 
change  during  the 1980s  in the basic determinants  of investment  as they 
are commonly measured in the empirical  studies. Many econometric 
models rely on the concept of the cost of capital  to measure  the effects 
of changes  in interest  rates, taxes, and relative  prices;  and they use that 
measure  to specify  an optimal  capital-output  ratio, V. Investment  is then 
modeled as adjusting  gradually  to changes in V and expected future 
output, Q*. A general  theoretical  model  of this type would be: 
K*=  V.Q*, 
V =  -,  and 
c 
c  =  -(d  +  i -  p) 
19. The overstatement  of computers  in the constant  dollar  estimates  will continue  to 
grow as we move away from the base year of 1982  for the fixed-weight  indexes. Fixed 
weights  do not work  well when there  are major  changes  in relative  prices  combined  with 
large  changes  in relative  quantities,  precisely the situation  for computers.  One solution 
would  be to change  the weights  more  frequently  and  link  series  with  different  base  weights 
to form  a continuous  series, but such a measure  is hard  for the uninitiated  to understand 
because  the total  is no longer  the sum  of its components. 
20. It is worth  noting  that  the 1981  tax changes  did not change  the treatment  of office 
computers. 
21. The shift  toward  computers  can  be viewed  as a continuation  of a longer-term  trend 
toward shorter-lived  capital. That trend implies that indexes of gross investment  are 
becoming  increasingly  inaccurate  proxies  for measuring  the rate  of capital  accumulation. 
On the other hand,  the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  adjusts  for changes  in service lives in Barry  Bosworth  99 
where 
Pk =  the price  of capital, 
Pq =  the price of output, 
d =  the rate of depreciation, 
i = the nominal  after-tax  cost of funds, 
p  =  the expected  change in Pk,  and 
t = a complex term  that  takes account  of all changes  in the tax 
treatment  of investment. 
In empirical  formulations, some compromises are made with this 
theoretical  model.  Surprisingly,  these  formulations  imply  a large  increase 
in the optimal  capital-output  ratio, V, during  the 1980s  despite the rise 
in the real interest rate. The MPS model of the Federal Reserve, for 
example, obtains an increase of  12 percent in the desired stock of 
equipment  between 1979  and 1988.  That  increase  can be traced  directly 
to a large decline in the relative price of capital as measured in the 
national accounts. The implicit price deflator  for producers' durable 
equipment,  which  incorporates  computers,  has  fallen  20  percent  relative 
to the output  price index since 1979-an implied  increase  in the optimal 
stock of capital that is  about three times larger than the increase 
associated  with the 1981  reductions  in business taxes. 
The empirical  formulations,  however, ignore the associated rise in 
the depreciation  rate,  d, implied  by the shorter  service life of computers; 
and  they typically  use the expected increase  in output  prices rather  than 
the price  of capital  to compute  the real rate of interest, i -  p. Yet, from 
the perspective of a purchaser  of capital it is the expected change in 
capital  goods prices, not the general rate of inflation,  that is relevant. 
Currently,  the treatment  of computers  in the national  accounts reduces 
the rate  of price increase  for overall business equipment  by 1-2 percent 
annually;  thus, the appropriate  measure  of the real interest rate would 
be correspondingly  higher  than that shown in table 5. The combination 
of an increased  rate of depreciation  and a lower expected rate of price 
change  would have offset much of the increase in V that resulted  from 
the change  in relative  prices. 
computing  its measures  of multifactor  productivity  in U.  S. industry:  a shift  toward  shorter- 
lived capital  raises an index of capital  services relative  to an index of the capital  stock 
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Furthermore  there is little agreement  on how to measure  the cost of 
funds, i. One approach  is to assume that  firms  equalize  the cost of using 
different  sources of funds at the margin  and  to employ  the after-tax  cost 
of borrowing  plus a risk  premium  to approximate  changes in the cost of 
funds. If the risk premium  is assumed to be relatively constant over 
time, the real  cost of funds, i -  p, has increased  in line with  the measure 
shown in column 3 of table 5 because the decline in price inflation  has 
not been fully reflected in lower nominal  interest rates. On the other 
hand, many econometric  studies of investment  use a weighted  average 
of bond  rates  and  the dividend-price  ratio, shown in column  6 of table  5, 
to measure  the cost of funds, and argue  that  the decline in the latter  has 
offset much  of the increase  in real interest  rates. The MPS model of the 
Federal  Reserve, for example, currently  assigns a weight of 90 percent 
to the dividend-price  ratio, leaving little room for a direct effect of 
interest  rates  on investment. 
In summary,  the 1980s  have done far less than one might expect to 
resolve the debate over the effect of monetary  policy on investment. 
However, while the treatment  of computer  investment  in the national 
accounts raises complex issues for measuring  productivity  growth, the 
expansion  of such outlays in the 1980s  is rather  meaningless  for stabili- 
zation policy. The increase in the volume of investment  absorbed  very 
little employment-it  was due to huge increases in the productivity  of 
the computer  industry-and, when converted  back to current  dollars,  it 
generated very little income. Outlays on office computing  equipment 
totaled  only $40  billion  in 1988.  If we set aside  the share  of output  devoted 
to computers, investment did decline substantially  on both a net and 
gross basis, despite the benefits of a long expansion of total demand. 
That  outcome  seems consistent  with  the view that  high  real  interest  rates 
do crowd out some domestic investment, although  the magnitude  may 
be less than some of the high estimates of the 1970s.22 
It is sometimes argued  that the growth of corporate  debt in recent 
22. Models that do incorporate  a major  role for the cost of capital  commonly  do so 
within  a formulation  that  also implies  very long  lags. The model  used by Data  Resources, 
Inc., and  the MPS  model  of the Federal  Reserve  both  include  a strong  effect of changes  in 
the cost of capital  in investment  decisions, an elasticity  of substitution  of unity;  but the 
mean  lag exceeds three  years. This is not critical  for the debate  over tax policy where  the 
focus is on the long run, but the lags do severely limit the usefulness of the link to 
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years has increased  the vulnerability  of corporations  to a sharp  rise in 
market  interest rates and that business investment will thus be more 
sensitive to monetary policy in the future. An earlier study in the 
Brookings  Papers did conclude that  there has been some increase  in the 
ratio  of corporate  debt to assets in recent  years and  that  the ratio  of cash 
flow to interest payments-interest coverage-has  deteriorated  during 
the 1980s,  particularly  for firms  at the extreme  end of the distribution  of 
firms  ranked  by reliance on debt.23  However, it is not evident that the 
increased  debt has reached  the point at which it has major  implications 
for aggregate  investment  behavior.  The decline in the coverage ratio is 
a reflection  of a long-term  trend that was far more dramatic  in earlier 
decades:  for nonfinancial  corporations  the ratio  of gross cash flow net of 
taxes and  dividends  to net interest  payments  stood at 12.3  in 1959,  5.6 in 
1969,  5.2 in 1979,  and 4.0 in 1988.  In addition,  60 percent of the debt is 
in long-term  instruments  for which the cost is only marginally  affected 
by short-run  changes in market  interest rates: and nonfinancial  corpo- 
rations  have actually increased the ratio of liquid assets to short-term 
debt in the 1980s.  The greater  reliance  on  junk bond financing  may raise 
the risk of bankruptcy  for firms  at the extreme end of the distribution, 
but  there  is no strong  argument  for assuming  that  it will greatly  alter  the 
response of investment to monetary  policy in the future. This seems 
particularly  true in light of the limited  evidence that financial  structure 
has a major  role in the investment  decision. 
Foreign Trade 
The expansion  of international  capital  markets  during  the past  decade 
has greatly increased the potential importance  of exchange rates as a 
channel through  which monetary  policy affects the economy. Yet the 
inability  to anticipate  the quantitative  magnitude  of that linkage  in the 
early  1980s  is also a vivid  example  of the uncertainties  that  must  surround 
any estimate  of the future  effects of policy. 
In recent years a great deal of research has been undertaken  to 
quantify  the linkages  between monetary  policy and the trade balance. 
That research has emphasized three elements: the response of the 
23. Bernanke  and  Campbell  (1988). 102  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
exchange rate to changes in interest  rates, the response of trade  prices 
to changes  in the exchange  rate, and  the response  of exports  and  imports 
to changes  in  prices. Researchers  agree  that  differences  between  interest 
rates  at home and  abroad  have a strong  impact  on the exchange  rate, but 
the complexity of dealing with expectations and the response of the 
monetary  authorities  in other countries makes it difficult  to reach any 
consensus on the size of the impact. Estimates of the change in the 
exchange rate that would follow from a widening  of the differential  on 
long-term  bonds are in the range  of 5-15 percent.24 
A greater degree of consensus has emerged with respect to the 
response of trade and trade prices to changes in exchange rates. Esti- 
mates of the price elasticity of goods imports and exports have been 
consistently in the range  of unity, and those estimates seem stable over 
time. Some disagreement  remains  about the precise size of the change 
in trade prices that will follow from a change in the exchange rate. 
Significantly,  all the studies agree that the lags in the response of trade 
are very long, extending  over several years, and that  there  is little or no 
response in the first  few quarters.  In fact several studies  find  a perverse 
effect  on the nominal  trade  balance  for  several  quarters  after  an  exchange 
rate  change. On  the whole, they conclude  that  the biggest  surprise  in the 
1980s was in the failure to anticipate the size of change in the real 
exchange  rate  itself, rather  than  in the response of trade  to that  change. 
An illustration  of the structure  of the lagged  response  of the real  trade 
balance and the current  account to a 1 percentage  point change in the 
U. S. Treasury  bill  rate  and  an  associated  6 percent  change  in  the  exchange 
rate is shown in figure  5 by quarters  following  the change for the trade 
sector of the Federal  Reserve's Multicountry  Model.25  This is purposely 
a partial-equilibrium  simulation that is intended to focus on the lag 
between a policy change and its impact on the general economy. It 
excludes the induced effect on domestic incomes and prices, and the 
potential  feedback  from  the rest of the world.  For comparison  purposes, 
the impact  of a change in fiscal policy, ignoring  the decision lag, is felt 
within  one period. 
As can be seen, it requires  about eight quarters  for a change in the 
real exchange  rate to fully affect trade  prices and quantities.  After eight 
24. The basic model  is outlined  in Sachs (1988,  pp. 655-59);  but  the limited  amount  of 
historical  data has resulted  in widely varying  estimates  of the precise magnitude  of the 
response.  For an example  of the diversity,  see Bryant,  Holtham,  and  Hooper  (1988). 
25. The basic  model  is outlined  in Helkie  and  Hooper  (1988). Barry Bosworth  103 
Figure 5.  Economic Response to an Increase in the Interest Rate and the Exchange Rate, 
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Source: Author's calculations.  Assumes  a I percent increase in the U.S.  Treasury bill rate and a 6 percent increase 
in the value of the dollar to all other currencies. 
quarters the continued gradual decline is due largely to interest payments 
on the growing foreign debt.  In current dollars the first-year impact is 
even more limited. The sharp decline of the current account in the first 
period is dominated by the capital loss  on the income  from overseas 
direct investments  (denominated in foreign currencies) associated  with 
the exchange  rate change.  Then there is a perverse  J-curve  effect  on 
imports that limits the decline for several quarters. Several other studies 
have  found  even  longer  lags  than those  shown  in the table,  and the 
Multicountry Model did tend to predict the  1987-88 turnaround in the 
trade balance several quarters before it actually occurred. 
Implications  for Policy 
The above review of recent changes in the structure of the economy 
suggests that changes in monetary policy now take longer to take effect. 
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of monetary  policy were immediate  and strong, is now somewhat  less 
affected  by interest  rates.  The  offsetting  increase  in  the  effect  of monetary 
policy in the trade  sector is small  in the short  run  and takes place over a 
number  of years. The effect on consumer spending,  however, may be 
greater. 
More important,  existing quantitative  estimates of the potential  im- 
pact of monetary  policy are themselves highly  uncertain,  and  the recent 
systemic changes  make  their  dependability  as a guide  for the future  that 
much more questionable.  Predicting  the future  from past responses to 
episodes of monetary  restraint  may never be prudent:  over the past few 
decades each new episode has confounded  much  of the established  view 
and kept the profession busy for several years explaining the new 
surprise.  But the problem  would  seem to be particularly  severe this time 
because the institutional  change  is so profound.26 
How should policy respond to these changes? One view, espoused 
by Milton  Friedman,  is that because the lags are long and variable,  the 
best policy is one that makes no effort to adjust to current  economic 
conditions.27  Many  other  economists, however, hold to the hope that  an 
activist policy that responds to the current  and expected state of the 
economy could do better. Should a lengthening  of the lags alter the 
balance of this debate or the approach  to the policy decision that a 
member  of the activist school would urge the monetary  authorities  to 
adopt? 
First, the issue of active as against  passive policies should  be distin- 
guished  from an associated debate about  policy rules as against  discre- 
tion, which  has  dominated  much  of the discussion. For  an  activist  policy, 
one that responds  to current  economic conditions, there  can be activist 
rules: one example is automatic stabilizers, such as unemployment 
insurance.  The debate  over rules  as against  discretion  is more  concerned 
with  the effect of policy on economic  agents'  expectations.  And  perhaps 
there is some consensus that if we knew the structure  of the economy 
sufficiently  well to derive  an optimal  policy and  if we were  confident  that 
26. Existing  estimates  would be highly  uncertain  even without  introducing  the issue 
of systemic  change.  One need only read  the previously  referenced  articles  comparing  the 
structure  of the various  econometric  models  to be struck  by the enormous  diversity  of the 
policy  multipliers.  Over  the  past  decade  the tendency  has  been  for  these models  to diverge 
rather  than  converge  toward  a common  view of the efficacy  of monetary  policy. 
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the structure  would  not change,  it would  be better  to formulate  the policy 
in terms  of a rule  rather  than  relying  on discretion.28 
A point of departure  for the issue of activist policy is provided  by a 
set of old but insightful  articles by A. W. Phillips.29  He distinguished 
three  forms  of stabilization  policy:  proportionate,  integral,  and  derivative 
stabilizers. With a proportionate  stabilizer  the policy response is pro- 
portionate  to the departure  of the target (for example, GNP) from its 
desired  value in the current  period;  an integral  stabilizer  responds  to the 
cumulative  sum of past departures;  and a derivative  stabilizer  responds 
to its rate  of change. Phillips  argued  that an optimal  policy mix requires 
all three because, while a proportionate  stabilizer  will reduce the gap 
between the actual and desired outcomes, an integral stabilizer is 
required to close the gap completely, and a derivative stabilizer is 
required  to reduce  the tendency  of the first  two to introduce  oscillations. 
In his 1957 article Phillips concluded that lags in the policy response 
greatly  complicate  the choice of an optimal  combination  of the policies; 
but, in general, the existence of lags called for a more cautious policy 
that  reduced  the role of the proportionate  and integral  policy responses 
and  increased  that  of derivative  stabilizers. 
This formulation still has relevance to  today's debate over the 
appropriate  response  to renewed  threats  of inflation.  The administration 
often displays  a proportionate  policy response by being content to wait 
for inflation  to re-emerge  before  supporting  a shift  of policy. The Federal 
Reserve, like a derivative stabilizer, is  more concerned about the 
direction  of change and what it perceives as evidence of accelerating 
inflation.  A concern with rates of change is evident in Federal  Reserve 
behavior  that  is sometimes  described  as "leaning  against  the wind." 
Another  important  distinction  is between the concept of a distributed 
lag response to a policy change and a delayed response. The existence 
of delay is a very serious problem  for policymakers  because they may 
be simply powerless to respond in a timely fashion to disturbances  as 
they develop, and by attempting  to respond they may be induced to 
overreact, in the mistaken  notion that past actions had no effect. One 
need only imagine  driving  an automobile  that responded  to turns  of the 
steering wheel only after a long delay to understand  the increased 
28. Kydland  and Prescott  (1977).  A summary  of the subsequent  literature  is provided 
in Fischer  (1988). 
29.  Phillips (1954 and 1957). 106  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
complexity of the control problem. As  Phillips reported, once one 
introduces a delay, even reliance on derivative stabilizers can fail to 
prevent  the system from oscillating  into instability.  In economic policy 
the concept of an "inside lag"-  the time between a disturbance  and 
enactment  of a policy change-is  an example  of delay; and, in the case 
of fiscal  policy, it is probably  sufficient  to rule  out the use of such policy 
changes  except in unusually  severe disturbances. 
The existence of a distributed  lag response, taken by itself, would 
seem to be a less serious problem.  As long as the policymaker  is free to 
vary the control  variable  in each period, a disturbance  that arises out of 
past changes in policy is largely  indistinguishable  from any other. Lags 
in the policy response raise problems similar  to those encountered  in 
any system in which the endogenous  process being controlled  incorpo- 
rates a lag process. The main concerns raised by lags are the potential 
for increased  volatility  of the control variable  and the increased  risk of 
introducing  oscillations. 
In practice, the concepts of delay and distributed-lag  responses are 
often confused because an increased lag is thought of as implying a 
reduced  response  of the economy to policy change  in the current  period. 
It is perhaps  clearer  to say that we should  be concerned  with the shape 
of the lag over time and not just its average length. The policymaker 
could attempt  to overcome some of the problems  of a delayed or weak 
initial effect by finding some way to forecast changes in the target 
variable  or by finding  a reliable  early  indicator  of its changes.  These two 
approaches  are not quite equivalent. By definition,  the early indicator 
may provide information  about future  disturbances,  but it can provide 
no information  about  the future  effects of current  policy change. On the 
other hand, econometric models may have some value in quantifying 
the future  effects of today's policy, but they have been less successful 
in forecasting  the disturbances  themselves. Hence policymakers  have 
relied  on a combination  of intermediate  indicators  and  the projections  of 
econometric  models. 
Extensions of  Phillips's analysis by William Brainard, J. Phillip 
Cooper, and Stanley Fischer suggest that an emphasis on derivative 
stabilizers  may be less useful in a stochastic situation  where  the lags are 
variable.30  Basically, the introduction  of a stochastic element  raises the 
30. Brainard  (1967);  Fischer  and Cooper  (1973).  See also Cooper  and Fischer  (1972a 
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risk of false signals for a policy that focuses on the rate of change. It 
creates an argument  for a less aggressive use of stabilization  policy- 
one is forced to accept larger  departures  of the target  variable  from its 
desired level. Cooper  and Fisher developed a model of a certain  world 
in which long lags were stabilizing and suggestive of a more active 
stabilization  policy, but the lengthening  of the policy lag reduced the 
efficiency of stabilization  policy in a stochastic version of the model. 
The result of analysis such as that of Fischer and Cooper tends to be 
highly model-specific,  but the analysis is interesting  in arguing  that the 
problem  of uncertainty  about the lag structure  is more important  than 
the length  of the lag itself.3' 
The problem  of lags does take on greater  significance  if variability  in 
the control  variable  (that  is, money supply  or interest  rates)  is a serious 
concern. A small initial  response implies that the change in the control 
variable  required  to achieve a given change  in the target  becomes large. 
If the control variable itself, or a closely associated variable, is an 
important  element in private decisionmaking,  its increased variability 
may reduce  the efficiency  of the system.32 
In the present  context it is the reduced  impact  of monetary  policy on 
the housing market that should be of primary  interest. In the past a 
tightening  of monetary  policy was reflected  within a few quarters  in a 
lower level of housing  starts, and many  econometric  models imply that 
the peak effect is reached  early in the second year. It was the decline of 
housing  production  that accounted  for the overwhelming  proportion  of 
monetary  restraint  in 1979-81;  other elements of demand  declined, but 
primarily  through  the induced multiplier  process lowering output and 
income. A lower interest elasticity of housing implies a more steeply 
sloped  IS curve,  a larger  aggregate  demand  response  to real  disturbances, 
and  a reduced  ability  to control  fluctuations  except at the cost of a wider 
range  of fluctuation  in interest  rates. 
The effects of the increased  role of the international  sector are more 
ambivalent.  First, the greater  potential  for the exchange  rate  to move in 
tandem  with the interest  rate increases the stability  of the basic system 
over an intermediate period. Domestic anti-inflation  policy is  also 
31. Their  analysis  is restricted  to a first-order  difference  equation  representation  of the 
basic system being controlled.  They do not explore the control  of a system that is itself 
subject to oscillation and potential  instability.  The model becomes second-order  only 
through  the introduction  of a derivative  stabilizer  in the policy reaction  function. 
32. Holbrook  (1972);  Chow  (1973). 108  Brookings Paper-s on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
enhanced  because a restrictive  domestic monetary  policy will induce a 
fall in import  prices. On the other hand, the gain in the terms of trade 
will hold up domestic real incomes and reduce the domestic demand 
effects of the policy change. The dominant  effect, however, will be the 
change  in the impact  on trade  flows, and there the basic problem  is that 
the lags are so long as to limit its usefulness for short-run  stabilization 
policy. 
The combination  of a reduced housing demand impact and an in- 
creased impact on trade has resulted in a situation in which the lag 
structure  of the response to monetary  policy is almost  certainly  weaker 
initially and even more "humped-back"  in subsequent periods. At a 
minimum,  it suggests  a reduced  ability  of the Federal  Reserve to engage 
in "fine-tuning"  because of the questionable value of responding  to 
short-term  wiggles in demand  with a policy that will not have its real 
effect for two or three years-especially  in view of the uncertainty 
attached  to those lagged  effects. 
However, the Federal Reserve would deny that it is engaged in a 
policy of fine-tuning  despite  what  might  appear  to be excessive attention 
to every little wiggle in the economic indicators.  Nor is the inability  to 
engage  in fine-tuning  particularly  important  to society-we  worry  about 
the big cycles, not the little ones. Rather,  in the absence of a policy that 
can have an immediate  impact,  the Federal  Reserve feels that it cannot 
afford  to wait for problems, such as accelerating  inflation,  to emerge, 
but must  instead  act in anticipation  of them. The danger  is twofold. The 
urgency  of acting  quickly  increases  the potential  for forecast  errors,  and 
the uncertainty  over the policy lags means that the Federal Reserve 
never knows when "enough is enough." Its usual practice is to adjust 
policy and then wait to see what happens, but the longer the lags, the 
less it learns  about  the response to its own actions by waiting. 
The Federal Reserve could respond to this new environment by 
simply waiting, as the administration  appears  to be suggesting,  for the 
evidence  of inflation  or some other  disturbance  to become more  evident, 
and  then respond,  if necessary, with a stronger  dose of policy. The main 
argument  against  such an approach  is that  it suggests  the need for wider 
future  fluctuations  in interest  rates, and some would argue  that interest 
rate  instability  should  be avoided.33 
33. Inflation  is not  the best example  because  there  is a separate  argument  that  by acting 
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reversing  it would  be less. Barry  Bosworth  109 
It is not evident, however, that  interest  rate  variability  has a high  cost 
in today's financial  markets. Both savers and investors have a greatly 
expanded  range  of financial  inst-iirnents  through  which they can ensure 
against interest rate risk. The basic objective is to induce individual 
economic agents to voluntarily  substitute expenditures  tomorrow  for 
expenditures  today. An increase in interest  rate variability  implies that 
those who agree to do so are being rewarded  more than in the past. In 
the housing  market,  for  example,  we would  normally  believe that  interest 
rate rationing  of mortgages  is preferable  to the old system of quantity 
rationing. The old argument  that interest rate extremes were to be 
avoided  because the burden  fell so heavily on a narrow  sector, housing, 
would also seem to be of reduced  importance  today. The emergence  of 
increased interest rate variability was a necessaty  counterpart of a desire 
to broaden  the impact  of monetary  policy change  and  eliminate  quantity 
rationing. 
A new issue is the tendency of the exchange rate to be affected by 
interest rate changes. Thus, increased interest rate variability also 
implies increased variability  in the real exchange rate. One evident 
difference  is that the markets  that provide insurance  against  exchange 
rate  risk  are less developed than  the corresponding  markets  for interest 
rate risk, and increased variability  of exchange rates may reduce the 
volume of international  trade. However, on the basis of the statistical 
research  to date, it is difficult  to show that  the negative  effect on trade  is 
substantial  or that  the welfare  losses would  be large  if some reduction  in 
trade  did occur.34 
An additional  argument,  similar  to that  made  against  the  concentration 
of previous restraint  on housing, is that exchange rate increases fall 
heavily  on export  industries  that  are  often  at the edge of new technology, 
and they may fall behind  in a heavily competitive  world market.  How- 
ever, it is not clear that the costs of disruption  are any greater for 
industries  that trade internationally  than for those that operate in the 
domestic  market. 
Paul Krugman  has argued  that exchange rate variability  may create 
inertia  in the response  of trade  to exchange  rates  because the fixed  costs 
associated  with trade  will lead  firms  to discount  short-run  changes.35  On 
the other hand, if the item being traded  is itself a durable  good, there 
34. A survey  of the literature  is provided  in International  Monetary  Fund  (1984). 
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may  be an increased  response  because of the opportunity  for capital  gain 
or loss. Furthermore,  the impact  on trade  would seem to be transitory. 
Exchange  rate  variability  will  lead  producers  to diversify  their  production 
base across currency  areas. Once  that  process is complete, it is not clear 
that the marginal  response of shifts in production  will be appreciably 
lower. 
The greater  problem  would seem to be that  we are simply  not used to 
thinking  of exchange  rate  changes  as a principal  element  of the monetary 
policy linkage, and changes in exchange rates still carry  psychological 
connotations about national strength. Interest rate changes lead to a 
redistribution  within the country of winners and losers. In contrast, 
changes  in exchange  rates  are  perceived  as altering  the relationship  with 
other countries.  There  are, however, important  domestic distributional 
effects: as consumers  we like high exchange rates, while as individual 
producers  of tradables  we like the competitive  benefit  of low exchange 
rates. 
Finally, Federal Reserve policies to  raise interest rates may be 
constrained  by fears of financial  crisis. This too is not a new argument. 
In past decades the Federal Reserve worried  about financial  disinter- 
mediation. Today, the concerns are bankruptcies  of highly leveraged 
firms,  further  losses by savings  and  loans, and  the  costs to less-developed 
debtor nations. It may be,  however, that the constraints are more 
important  today, and that vulnerability  of the financial system is an 
important  reason for worrying  about the reduced short-run  impact of 
policy. 
Many  of these concerns  would seem much  less immediate  were it not 
for the loss of fiscal policy as an instrument  of adjustment.  The loss of 
fiscal policy has forced monetary  policy to the extremes of historical 
experience,  as it is being  used to correct  for a secular  imbalance  between 
saving and investment rather  than as a cyclical stabilizer. The worry 
about interest rate fluctuations  is that they are around  the peak of past 
experience, raising fears of bankruptcy.  Similarly, the concern with 
exchange rate variations  is not with the short-run  changes that can be 
hedged in financial  markets,  but with large  deviations that persist over 
many years and have substantial  effects on the industrial  structure  of 
the economy. In other  words, much  of the concern can be traced  to the 
fact that monetary  adjustment  has become the only tool of economic 
policy. Comments 
and Discussion 
Alan S. Blinder: Barry  Bosworth  has set himself  an ambitious  task: to 
ruminate  and speculate on a question about which we do not yet have 
enough  data to make an informed  econometric  guess. My first  reaction 
was to admire  his courage  more  than  his  judgment.  My second reaction 
was that his positions on most issues were quite reasonable.  My third 
reaction  is due right  now and, I guess, is supposed to be more critical 
than  that. 
In thinking  about whether and how recent changes in the financial 
system may have affected the impact of monetary  policy on the U.S. 
economy, two rather  different  questions  come to mind. First, have the 
deregulation  and internationalization  of the American  financial  markets 
reduced  the impact  of market  interest  rates on spending?  And, second, 
have these same phenomena  reduced  the leverage  the Federal  Reserve 
has over U.S. domestic interest rates? Because Bosworth deals only 
with the first question, I'll start there. But I think  the second question 
also merits  attention,  perhaps  more  than  the first, so I'll finish  there. 
Many of us here get calls from  journalists asking about the likely 
effects of higher  interest  rates  on the economy. I generally  answer  these 
queries  by rounding  up the usual  suspects:  housing,  consumer  durables, 
and business fixed investment-in  that order. Bosworth focuses on 
housing,  business fixed investment,  and  trade  flows-in  that order. 
So my first  criticism  is that spending  on consumer  durables-mainly 
automobiles-should appear  in Bosworth's rogues' gallery. This com- 
ponent of aggregate  demand is roughly twice as large as spending  on 
residential construction and somewhat larger than that on producer 
durables.  It is also volatile, and  there  has long  been substantial  evidence 
that it is sensitive to interest rates. So it seems, at least potentially, a 
serious omission. 
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The question  is whether  recent changes in the financial  system have 
changed  the sensitivity of spending  on consumer  durables  to monetary 
policy. As one example, rationing  may now be less important  than it 
used to be. As another,  I have the casual impression  that concessional 
financing provided by automobile manufacturers  has become more 
common in recent years. Is this true? If so, does it weaken the link 
between  auto  loan  rates  and  market  interest  rates?  Or  is the concessional 
financing  just a disguised  price  reduction  that  consumers  can-and  do- 
cash out? Depending  on the answers to these and other questions, the 
automobile  market  today may or may not be less sensitive to Federal 
Reserve policy than it once was. It is even possible that the growth of 
concessional  financing  was a reaction  to the greater  volatility  of interest 
rates. I don't know the answers, but it seems that Bosworth should at 
least be asking  the questions. 
Housing  tops both my list of suspects and Bosworth's. The idea here 
is that innovations  like variable  rate mortgages  and the end of disinter- 
mediation  may have partially  insulated  the housing market  from tight 
money because there is less quantity  rationing  and because consumers 
can now practice intertemporal  substitution  in the mortgage  market 
without doing the same in the housing  market. Bosworth had the 
ingenious idea of trying to "test" this hypothesis by comparing  the 
United States and  Canada,  on the grounds  that  Canada  has for years had 
more  floating  rate  housing  finance  than  the United  States  has even today. 
He finds  that  the share  of residential  construction  in GNP is indeed  more 
interest  sensitive in the United States than  in Canada. 
The strength  of this  finding  (table  3)  depends  on whether  we are  talking 
about a general rise in interest rates or a tilting of the term structure. 
Focusing on the 1972-87 period, Bosworth estimates that a 100 basis 
point  rise in short  rates (with  long rates  held constant)  reduced  the share 
of housing  in GNP 36 basis points  after  one year  in the United States but 
only 8 basis  points  in Canada.  However, if we ask instead  what  happened 
when short  and  long rates  rose together,  the answers  are  that  a 100  basis 
point rise in interest rates reduced  the housing share 12 basis points in 
the United States and by the same 8 basis points in Canada-a  trivial 
difference.  This suggests, both to Bosworth  and to me, that disinterme- 
diation  and  temporary  postponements  accounted  for the greater  interest 
sensitivity in the United States during  this period. There is just one 
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follow approximate  random  walks, then consumers have no reason to 
postpone  taking  out fixed  rate  mortgages  when  rates  rise  because  today's 
mortgage  rate is the best estimate of tomorrow's. Some evidence that 
this is not the case would  bolster  Bosworth's  argument. 
One  final  point  on housing.  It seems to me that  Bosworth's  arguments 
suggest that not only the number  of new houses but also the prices of 
houses should have been made less volatile by financial  innovations 
because these changes  should  have stabilized  demand.  Is there  evidence 
that  this is true, or that  housing  prices are less volatile in Canada? 
Moving  down  the list, I come next to business  fixed  investment.  Here 
Bosworth does not seek evidence on changes in interest elasticity, 
presumably  because he sees no reason  to suspect  any. His main  question 
is what the 1980s  have taught  us about the interest elasticity question. 
My own reading  of the pre-1980s  econometric  evidence is that you had 
to torture  the data  pretty  hard  to make  it yield a sizable sensitivity  to the 
cost of capital. This seems to be Bosworth's view as well. Is the 
experience  of the 1980s  consistent  with this view? 
Before answering  this question, we need to get straight  what  actually 
happened  to the left-hand  and  right-hand  variables.  Barry  calculates  that 
the higher  real interest  rates of the 1980s  overwhelmed  the business tax 
cuts, leading to the rise in the cost of capital shown in table 5. Thus, 
believers in price elasticity should have expected the investment  share 
of GNP to fall, not rise. What actually happened  depends on whether 
you include  or  exclude  computers.  Bosworth  is inclined  to exclude  them, 
in which  case the investment  share  fell. All in all, I find  this a reasonable 
interpretation  of the data. 
Last on Bosworth's  list is foreign  trade.  The big surprise  of the 1980s 
was that fiscal deficits and tight money crowded out net exports rather 
than investment. This should change forevermore  the way we think 
about the effects of fiscal and monetary  policy in the United States. 
Bosworth suggests that we should revise our estimate of the timing  of 
monetary impacts more than our estimate of their ultimate strength, 
because the link from exchange rates to trade  flows is a slow one. And 
that, in turn, makes monetary  policy a less useful tool for short-run 
stabilization. 
I find  these reasonable  positions. But  when  I think  about  globalization, 
my mind quickly wanders  to the capital  account-where  it encounters 
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economy with perfect  international  capital  mobility  has no control  over 
domestic interest rates. Well, the U.S. economy is hardly small, and 
capital  mobility  may be imperfect.  Nonetheless, if international  capital 
mobility  has increased  dramatically,  then it seems the Federal  Reserve 
should  have less control  over U.S. interest  rates than  it used to. Yet the 
Federal  Reserve apparently  jacked up U.S. interest  rates  tremendously 
in 1979-81, pushed them down steadily from 1982  to 1986, and raised 
them sharply  in the past year. How could all this have happened  if the 
Federal Reserve was pushing against an integrated world financial 
market? 
There seem to be two quite different  answers. One is that the brave 
new world  is not as different  from  the cowardly  old world  as is popularly 
assumed.  Despite  rapid  telecommunications  and  the rise  of multinational 
business, assets denominated  in different  currencies  may remain  highly 
imperfect  substitutes  to portfolio  holders.  If so, U. S. and  foreign  interest 
rates live lives of their own, and the Federal Reserve still has much 
leverage  over the former. 
The second  possibility  is that  capital  mobility  forces the U.S. nominal 
interest rate for any particular  maturity to approximate  the foreign 
interest  rate  plus  the expected  depreciation  of the dollar  over the relevant 
time horizon. The Federal Reserve can therefore move U.S.  interest 
rates  relative  to foreign  ones only by changing  the expected depreciation 
of the dollar. This seems more plausible for short rates than for long 
rates. For example,  a tightening  of credit  that  raises U.S. short  rates can 
attract  capital  inflows, appreciate  the dollar, and thereby set up expec- 
tations  of subsequent  depreciation.  But I find  it hard  to believe that such 
operations  can strongly  affect, say, the expected exchange  rate 10  or 20 
years  from  now. If I am  right,  and  if it is long  rates  rather  than  short  rates 
that  matter  most for economic  activity, then  the Federal  Reserve should 
indeed  have less leverage  over the economy than  it used to. 
It would be interesting  to know which story is more true. Short of 
that, it would be interesting  to know what Bosworth thinks about the 
issue. 
David Romer: This thought-provoking  paper starts from the observa- 
tion that the financial  and monetary  environment  in the United States 
has changed  greatly  in recent  years. The paper  then  asks three  questions 
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First, are larger shifts in monetary  policy-specifically,  larger move- 
ments in interest rates-now  needed to bring  about a given change in 
aggregate  demand?  Second, have the channels  through  which monetary 
policy affects the economy changed?  And third,  is it more  difficult  than 
before to control the economy using monetary  policy; in other words, 
have  the  lags  and  uncertainty  in  the impact  of monetary  policy  increased? 
To summarize  quickly  both the paper  and my own comments, Barry 
Bosworth's  answers  to these three  questions  are  yes, yes, and  yes, while 
my answers  are yes, yes, and maybe. 
I should point out that these questions are inherently difficult to 
answer. They concern how various changes in the structure of the 
economy may have altered other relationships. Thus, pending the 
completion  of the new classical  research  program  of estimating  relation- 
ships  that are invariant  to changes  in policy rules and in institutions,  we 
cannot answer the questions  by examining  past relationships.  Instead, 
what  one has to do, and  what  Bosworth  does do, is to examine  a variety 
of suggestive  and qualitative  evidence. 
Bosworth's first question is whether larger  interest rate swings are 
now needed to achieve a given movement in aggregate  demand. The 
answer  to this question  is surely  yes. A simple  example  makes  the point. 
In the first  major  episode of tight  monetary  policy in the postwar  period, 
which  took place in 1947-48  and  preceded  the recession of 1948-49,  the 
commercial  paper  rate  rose about  60 basis  points. In  the 1979-80  episode 
of tight policy preceding  the 1981-82  recession, the rise was about 700 
basis points.  ' 
Bosworth suggests what seems to be the most plausible  explanation 
for this change. Over the postwar  period, we have moved increasingly 
from  a reliance  on interest  rate ceilings and quantity  rationing  of credit 
in times of tight  monetary  policy toward  the use of high  interest  rates to 
discourage  borrowing.  Disintermediation,  for example, is no longer  an 
important  element  of the monetary  transmission  mechanism.  Thus, it is 
hardly  surprising  that we see larger  interest  rate swings now than in the 
past. 
1. The changes  are computed  using monthly  averages  of the six-month  commercial 
paper  rate.  In the 1947-48  episode, the low and  high  of the commercial  paper  rate  occur  in 
August 1947  and October  1948,  respectively.  In the 1979-80  episode, they occur  in April 
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Although  I agree with Bosworth that larger  interest rate swings are 
needed to alter aggregate  demand, I am skeptical, for two reasons, of 
his contention  that adjustable  rate mortgages  help explain  why. First, I 
think that Bosworth is quite persuasive in arguing  that adjustable  rate 
mortgages  are less different  from  fixed  rate  mortgages  than  one might  be 
tempted  to think. Interest  rates are usually  adjusted  only annually;  both 
the annual change and the change over the life of the mortgage  are 
usually capped; and initial  discounts very often make the interest rate 
changes over the first  few years of the mortgage  largely  independent  of 
market  interest  rates. 
Second, it is hard to see how a shift even to mortgages  with fully 
flexible  rates would matter  greatly.  The expectations  theory of the term 
structure,  which  provides  a good first  approximation  to the data, tells us 
that  a rise in rates  on fixed  rate  mortgages  relative  to those on adjustable 
rate  mortgages,  for example,  would  simply  reflect  expectations  of future 
increases in short-term  rates and would therefore  not provide  a reason 
to switch from one type of mortgage  to the other. In addition, since 
interest rate movements are in practice highly persistent, rates on the 
two types of mortgages  tend  to move relatively  closely with  one another. 
Thus, I doubt  that  the kind  of weighing  of the comparative  attractiveness 
of the two types of mortgages  that Bosworth discusses is likely to be 
important  in  the  impact  of monetary  policy.2  Finally,  as Bosworth  argues, 
the effect on spending  of the redistribution  caused  by changes  in interest 
rates  under  adjustable  rate  mortgages  is likely to be quantitatively  small 
and to be dominated  by the effects on spending  of changes in interest 
payments  on government  debt. 
About Bosworth's second question I will be brief. The question is 
whether  the channels  through  which  monetary  policy has its effects have 
changed. The answer is clearly yes. Let me give just two examples. 
First,  the decline  of disintermediation  has very likely  reduced  the impact 
of monetary  policy on housing.  Second, the greater  role of foreign  trade 
has  increased  the importance  of the impact  of monetary  policy on import- 
competing  and export  industries. 
2. As Bosworth  suggests, initial  discounts may enable homebuyers  to qualify  more 
easily  for adjustable  rate  than  for fixed  rate  mortgages.  Thus,  there  may  be a move toward 
flexible  rate mortgages  when interest  rates rise. But the rise in rates still prevents  some 
households-namely, those who previously  were  just able to qualify  for adjustable  rate 
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Bosworth's  third  question  is whether  the Federal  Reserve's ability  to 
control  the economy has diminished.  Bosworth's answer is that it has. 
As I suggested  at the outset, I am unsure. 
As Bosworth  emphasizes,  there  are  really  two questions  here, namely 
whether  uncertainty  in the effects of policy has increased  and whether 
the lags have increased.  I will discuss each in turn. 
There are two reasons that I am skeptical that the uncertainty  of 
monetary  policy's effects has increased.  First, the transmission  mecha- 
nism  does not appear  to have been any more  direct  or straightforward  in 
the traditional  regulatory  and rationing  environment  than it is in the 
current  interest rate-oriented setting. Trying  to estimate how a given 
policy shift in the old regime might affect the economy might have 
required  guessing how certain restrictions on consumer credit would 
affect  total  borrowing  and spending,  or how rapidly  funds  might  flow  out 
of savings  institutions  bound  by interest  rate  ceilings.  These do not strike 
me as inherently  easier  to estimate  than  the responsiveness  of borrowing 
and spending  to increases  in interest  rates. 
Second, it is tempting  but  usually  wrong  to think  that  recent  economic 
changes are uniquely rapid or profound. The financial  and monetary 
system has been changing  continuously  since World  War  II. The shift 
away  from  rationing  and  toward  a reliance  on interest  rates,  for example, 
has been an ongoing  process. In a paper  written  for this  journal  almost 
10 years ago, Albert Wojnilower  argued that each postwar "credit 
crunch"  had been qualitatively  different  from  all that had come before, 
and indeed  that after  each episode the Federal  Reserve had taken steps 
to prevent  a recurrence  of that  particular  kind  of crunch.3  I cannot  think 
of a time when estimating  the impact of monetary  policy would have 
been easy. 
There are also two reasons for my skepticism  that monetary  policy 
now takes longer  to work. The first  is that, with the exception of direct, 
quantitative  credit  controls,  which have never  been a central  element  of 
monetary  policy, the steps in the transmission  mechanism  are broadly 
similar  now to what  they have been throughout  the postwar  period.  The 
first step is  from interest rate changes to  changes in lending and 
borrowing.  Today this step is directly  from  interest  rates to borrowing; 
traditionally  it might have been from interest rate differentials  to the 
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availability  of funds to institutions  facing interest rate ceilings. From 
there, the changes in lending  and borrowing  must affect spending  and 
then production.  Based on this description, I do not see any obvious 
reason to believe that the process will occur less rapidly  today than it 
did two or three  decades ago. 
Second, the lags in the impact  of monetary  policy have always been 
quite  long. The DRI  model, which  I think  of as embodying  the traditional 
wisdom, suggests that the maximum  impact of the change in policy 
occurs with a lag of about 8 to 10 quarters.4  This is not very different 
from  the lag  that  Bosworth  believes characterizes  the effects  of monetary 
policy today. In other words, I think that Bosworth may have jumped 
from the correct conclusion that current  lags are long to the shakier 
conclusion  that  the lags have lengthened. 
I do not mean  to argue  strongly  that the Federal  Reserve's ability  to 
control the economy has not diminished.  As I said at the outset, my 
answer  to Bosworth's third  question  is maybe, not no. But I think  that 
one can make nearly  as good a case that the uncertainty  and lags have 
decreased  as one can for the opposite  position. 
Finally, at times Bosworth is not clear about what comparison  he is 
attempting  to make. His goal seems to be to address  the question  of how 
the role and  impact  of monetary  policy may  have changed  since the early 
1980s,  but at times he compares  the present environment  not with that 
of 1980  but with that  of the 1950s  or 1960s.  I must say that I am doubtful 
that there have been dramatic  changes within this decade. As I have 
emphasized, the evolution of the monetary and financial  system has 
been a lengthy process. The same is true of the other changes that 
Bosworth  focuses on, such as the increased  openness of the economy 
and  the greater  degree  of international  capital  mobility.  And, despite  the 
credit  controls  of 1980,  rationing  does not appear  to have been a central 
part  of the monetary  restraint  of 1979-82. 
What  message should  we draw  from all this concerning  the conduct 
of monetary policy? The lesson I draw is that conducting monetary 
policy has always been difficult.  The environment  has been changing 
continually, the lags have always been long, and the uncertainty  has 
always been great.  Thus, I would conclude  that monetary  policy should 
be conducted  the way it always has been-using  a mix  of formal  models, 
4. Dornbusch  and  Fischer  (1987,  p. 436). Barry Bosworth  119 
rules  of thumb,  shrewd  observation,  instinct,  guesswork,  and  prayer.  In 
sum, the message that I draw is that being a central  banker  is a tough 
job, but not that  it is a tougher  job than  it was before. 
General Discussion 
Panelists  suggested  a number  of additional  ways in  which  the  monetary 
transmission  mechanism may have changed in recent years. Olivier 
Blanchard  suggested  that bankruptcies  may become an important  part 
of the transmission  mechanism  during  any future  monetary  contraction, 
as the rise in corporate  leverage has increased  the risks of bankruptcy 
for many firms. Robert Litan added that not only does the increased 
probability of bankruptcy increase the size and uncertainty of the 
economy's response  to high  interest  rates, but  those increases  are  likely 
to be anticipated,  adversely  affecting  investors' views of future  risks to 
investment.  Catherine  Mann  noted  that  a study  of the effects of financial 
innovation sponsored by the Bank for International  Settlements sug- 
gested that the risk of interest rate variability  is borne more by banks 
than  by nonfinancial  firms.  This makes  banks  more  prone  to bankruptcy 
and  may restrain  the stabilization  activity of central  banks. 
Joseph Stiglitz  thought  the emphasis  on nominal  interest  rates in the 
transmission  mechanism  unjustified.  He noted that real rates, not nom- 
inal  rates, affect real  activity and  that nominal  rate changes  are likely to 
be at least partially  offset by changes  in the rate  of inflation.  Further,  he 
believed there are persuasive theoretical  reasons, supported  by some 
empirical  evidence,  why credit  markets  should  not  be regarded  as auction 
markets in which prices provide all the relevant information  about 
scarcity.  Rather,  credit  constraints  and  credit  rationing  are  an important 
part of the monetary  mechanism. Charles Schultze, however, argued 
that the securitization  of the credit markets  over the past 15 years has, 
if anything,  decreased  the importance  of credit  rationing  in  the one sector 
where it had  been considered  most important. 
Gregory  Mankiw  suggested  two reasons why monetary  policy might 
operate  through  the nominal  rather  than  the real  rate. First,  the mortgage 
a household  can  obtain  depends  on monthly  payments  relative  to income, 
and monthly  payments  are essentially nominal  interest  payments. Sec- 
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because most mortgages are not assumable. Hence, the demand for 
housing will be affected by the nominal  rate, even if the real rate is 
constant.  Robert  Hall  believed that  another  reason  nominal  rates  appear 
empirically  significant  is that inflation  itself is invariably  the sign of bad 
news. When inflation  is subtracted  from interest rates to obtain a real 
rate rather than being considered separately, valuable information  is 
lost. 
Christopher  Sims noted that the best predictor  of real activity six 
months ahead is the spread between the commercial  paper rate and 
Treasury  bill rate. This suggests that a negative correlation  between 
interest rates and output may be due to changes in business risk, not 
generated  by changes  in monetary  policy. 
John Shoven was dissatisfied  with Bosworth's specification  of the 
cost of capital.  The link  between interest  rates and investment,  he said, 
should include a risk premium.  Not only does a risk premium  explain 
why rates  on financial  assets appear  much  lower than  the rates required 
by firms,  but  the  premium  may  well vary  overtime. Shoven  also criticized 
the dividend-price  ratio  as a measure  of the cost of equity  funds. Because 
economists cannot explain  why firms  pay dividends  in the first  place, it 
seems unwise to use them as a key ingredient  in the determination  of 
investment.  He believed earnings-price  ratio  is a better  measure,  partic- 
ularly if accounting earnings are adjusted to an economically more 
meaningful  measure. Martin  Baily observed that as the U.S. economy 
has become more open, the investment decisions of large companies 
have come to involve allocations  across countries.  This global  perspec- 
tive makes domestic investment even more responsive to monetary 
policy and  makes  the exchange  rate  one of the channels  by which  policy 
affects investment.  Baily also noted  that  an analysis  of the effectiveness 
of monetary  policy that is limited to the IS curve, as is Bosworth's, 
might  be misleading.  The deregulation  of deposit  rates has made  the LM 
curve steeper and, on those grounds, made monetary policy more 
effective. 
George  von Furstenberg  noted that  the relationship  between interest 
rates and exchange rates depends crucially on the regime governing 
exchange  rate  management  and  the source  of shocks. In  a world  in which 
countries  try to stabilize exchange rates with respect to exchange rate 
shocks by adjusting  their  monetary  policies, interest  rate  instability  may 
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actually be correlated with depreciation as countries counteract ex- 
change rate shocks by rate increases. Hence,  greater interest rate 
variability  may correspond  to greater  efforts to stabilize the exchange 
rate, benefiting,  not deterring,  trade. 
William  Branson  observed  that  the estimated  effect of a change  in the 
exchange  rate on net exports is two to three times the usual estimates. 
Peter  Hooper  explained  that the effect has increased  over time with the 
scale of U.S. trade  and  that  the estimates  Bosworth  presents, in contrast 
to most studies, take into account  the effect of an endogenous  change  in 
interest rates, which has a bigger impact on net investment income 
payments  now because of the growing  U.S. net external  debt. 
Charles  Holt thought  Bosworth's theory of policy discussion over- 
stated  the ease with which policymakers  could stabilize  the economy in 
the presence of long  lags. He argued  that  adding  "derivative"  control  to 
offset increased  lags in response  created  its own problems  in the form  of 
increased variability  of the control variables and that policymakers 
would have to respond  more slowly and  less strongly  to disturbances  of 
the economy. Therefore, Bosworth's conclusion that the lags have 
increased  and  become more  variable  implies  that  the Federal  Reserve's 
ability  to control  the economy has decreased.  William  Nordhaus,  agree- 
ing with Holt's general  conclusion, suggested  that the length of the lag 
structure  per se was of secondary  importance  and cited earlier  work by 
Brainard  showing  that uncertainty  about the response of the economy 
to monetary  policy was the crucial  element  in performance.  Longer  lags 
are likely to reduce  policy effectiveness because they are almost surely 
associated  with increased  uncertainty  about  the economy's response to 
policy. 
William  Poole wished that Bosworth had addressed  the issue of the 
changing  relation  between inflation  expectations  and interest  rates. He 
observed  that nominal  and  real interest  rates were positively correlated 
for  the  periods  before  1968  and  in  the 1980s,  whereas  they  were  negatively 
correlated  between 1968  and 1980.  The nature  of the lags of response of 
real  activity  to changes  in interest  rates  depends, according  to Poole, on 
people's perceptions  of how changes in nominal  rates affect real rates 
and whether  these changes are permanent  or not. George  Perry  did not 
believe that the change in the relationship  between interest rates and 
real activity was a puzzle, noting  that fiscal policy and external  shocks 
were quite  different  during  the subperiods.  James  Duesenberry  agreed, 122  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
noting  that at times, for example 1966,  monetary  and fiscal policy were 
working  in opposite directions.  At such times monetary  policy will look 
ineffective  unless one takes into account  the impact  of fiscal  policy. 
James Tobin wondered how Bosworth's conclusion that monetary 
policy is less effective than it used to be can be reconciled with the 
observation that in recent years the U.S.  economy has enjoyed a 
successful recovery, managed, like the preceding recessions, by the 
Federal Reserve. Although fiscal policy was stimulative during this 
period, it was not adjusted  year to year in response  to economic events. 
In Tobin's  view, the Federal  Reserve  deserves most of the credit. Given 
overexpansionary  fiscal policy, the Federal  Reserve had to keep a foot 
on the brake,  but they kept it on in a variable  degree, smoothing  out the 
pace of recovery and  avoiding  a hard  landing. Barry Bosworth  123 
References 
Adams, F. Gerald,  and Lawrence  R. Klein. 1989. "Performance  of Quarterly 
Econometric Models of  the  United States: A  New  Round of  Model 
Comparisons." University of  Pennsylvania Department of  Economics 
(January  31). 
Bernanke,  Ben S., and John Y. Campbell.  1988. "Is There a Corporate  Debt 
Crisis?"  BPEA, 1:1988,  83-125. 
Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System. 1988.  Balance  Sheets for 
the U.S. Economy, 1948-87. Washington  (October). 
Brainard, William. 1967. "Uncertainty and the  Effectiveness of  Policy." 
American  Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings 57: 411-25. 
Bryant, Ralph, Gerald Holtham, and Peter Hooper. 1988. "Consensus and 
Diversity in the Model Simulations." In Empirical Macroeconomics  for 
Interdependent Economies,  edited  by Ralph  Bryant  and  others.  Washington: 
Brookings. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. 1985.  Business  Statistics,  1984. Washington: 
Department  of Commerce. 
. 1986.  National Income and Product Accounts, 1929-82: Statistical 
Tables. Washington:  Department  of Commerce. 
. Various  years. Survey  of Current  Business. Washington:  Department 
of Commerce. 
Carroll,  Chris,  and Lawrence  H. Summers.  1987.  "Why Have Private  Savings 
Rates in the United States and Canada  Diverged?" Journal  of Monetary 
Economics 20: 249-79. 
Chow, Gregory  C. 1973. "Problems  of Economic Policy from the Viewpoint 
of Optimal  Control."  American  Economic Review 63: 825-37. 
Cooper, J. Phillip, and Stanley Fischer. 1972a. "Simulations of Monetary 
Rules  in  the  FRB-MIT-Penn  Model."  Journal  of Money, Credit  and  Banking 
4: 384-96. 
.  1972b. "Stabilization  Policy and Lags: Summary  and Extension." 
Annals of Economic and Social Measurement  1: 407-18. 
Dornbusch,  Rudiger,  and Stanley  Fischer. 1987.  Macroeconomics,  4th edition. 
New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Economic  Report of the President. 1989  (January). 
Fischer, Stanley.  1988. "Rules  Versus Discretion in  Monetary Policy." 
Working  Paper 2518. Cambridge,  Mass.: National Bureau of Economic 
Research  (February). 
Fischer, Stanley, and  J. Phillip  Cooper. 1973.  "Stabilization  Policy and Lags." 
Journal  of Political Economy 81:  847-77. 
Friedman, Milton. 1959. A Program  for  Monetary Stability. Bronx, N.Y.: 
Fordham  University Press. 124  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
Goodman, John L.,  Jr., Charles A.  Luckett, and David W. Wilcox. 1988. 
"Interest Rates and Household Cash Flow."  Washington:  Division of 
Research  and Statistics, Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System 
(December). 
Helkie, William  L., and Peter Hooper. 1988. "An Empirical  Analysis of the 
External Deficit, 1980-86." In External  Deficits  and  the Dollar:  The Pit 
and The Pendulum,  edited by Ralph  C. Bryant,  Gerald  Holtham,  and Peter 
Hooper. Washington:  Brookings. 
Hendry, David F., and Thomas von Unger-Sternburg.  1981. "Liquidity and 
Inflation  Effects on Consumers' Expenditure." In Essays  in  the  Theory 
and Measurement  of Consumer Behavior,  edited by Angus Deaton. Cam- 
bridge:  Cambridge  University Press. 
Holbrook, Robert S.  1972. "Optimal  Economic Policy and the Problem of 
Instrument  Instability."  American Economic  Review  62: 57-65. 
International  Monetary  Fund. 1984. "Exchange Rate Variability  and World 
Trade." Occasional  Paper  28. Washington  (July). 
Kydland, Finn E.,  and Edward C.  Prescott.  1977. "Rules Rather Than 
Discretion: The Inconsistency of  Optimal Plans." Journal  of  Political 
Economy  85: 473-91. 
Krugman,  Paul R. 1989.  Exchange-Rate  Instability.  Cambridge,  Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
Phillips, A. W. 1954. "Stabilization  Policy in a Closed Economy." Economic 
Journal 64: 290-323. 
. 1957.  "Stabilization  Policy and  the Time-Forms  of Lagged  Responses." 
Economic  Journal 67: 265-77. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D.  1988. "Global Adjustments to  a  Shrinking  U.S.  Trade 
Deficit." BPEA, 2:1988, 639-67. 
Survey of Current Business.  See Bureau  of Economic Analysis. 
Wojnilower, Albert M.  "The Central Role of  Credit Crunches in Recent 
Financial  History," BPEA,  2:1980, 277-326. 